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ABSTRACT
Three large current account imbalances – one deficit (the United States) and two surpluses (Japan
and the Euro area) – are subjected to a minimalist structural interpretation. Though simple, this
interpretation enables us to assess how much of each of the imbalances require a real exchange rate
adjustment. According to the estimates, a large part of the U.S. current account deficit (nearly 2
percentage points of the 2004 deficit of 5½ percent of GDP) will undergo an adjustment process that
involves real depreciation in its exchange rate. For Japan, a little more than 1 percentage point (of
GDP)  of  the  current  account  surplus  is  found  to  require  an  exchange  rate  movement  (real
appreciation) as the surpluses adjust down. For the Euro area, less than half a percentage point of its












There has been a vigorous debate regarding the origin and implications of the 
current account imbalances that have become ever more prominent over the past couple 
of years. With the debate showing no sign of abatement, now seems a good time to 
impose a little “structure” upon the discussion. We say “a little” because in this paper, we 
follow a middle road, aiming to avoid the amorphous argument over whether there is a 
global savings glut or revived Bretton Woods arrangement, and at the same time provide 
a differing perspective from those gleaned from the new generation of dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models.  
To provide a little context, consider the savings glut/investment drought 
perspective most closely associated with Bernanke (2005).
1 In his view, the US current 
account deficit is the outcome of deficient savings in the U.S., excess savings relative to 
investment in East Asia and Europe, and the relatively higher rate of return on U.S. 
assets. Setting aside the dissonant fact that U.S. private sector savings in 2004 are much 
like they were in 2000, the argument achieves some amorphousness by virtue of the fact 
that “normal” – which is necessary to defining what is excess and what is deficient – is 
never defined, except by virtue of arbitrarily selected reference periods. 
On another front of the debate is the disagreement between the new generation of 
macroeconomic models, epitomized by the Fed’s Sigma model and the IMF’s Global 
                                                 
1 Related papers include Clarida (2004, 2005) and Hubbard (2005).  For an econometric 
critique, see Chinn and Ito (2005). On a somewhat different but related note, Gourinchas 
and Rey (2005) and Blanchard et al. (2005) both emphasized the role that the foreign 
interest in the U.S. assets played in the current developments and prospects of the U.S. 
current account deficit.   - 2 -   
Economic Model.
2 Both of these models typify an approach that incorporates enormous 
amounts of structure and internal consistency. Yet, despite the common theoretical 
ancestry of these models, they disagree substantially about the impact of fiscal policy on 
the accumulation of external debt, as well as the impact of fiscal policy on the current 
account. In part, these differences are driven by differences in the behavioral aspects of 
the models, and in part driven by the differing assumptions used in conducting the 
simulations.  
Yet another view on the likely evolution of imbalances has been provided through 
correlations viewed through the prism of event studies. Careful studies of this nature have 
been conducted by Croke et al. (2005), Freund and Warnock (2005), and Galati and 
Debelle (2005). They examine previous current account deficit reductions in developed 
economies. While useful, the event study approach aggregates and averages the shocks 
both within and across episodes.
3 
For these reasons, we believe that it would be a profitable enterprise to apply a 
method that, in principle, can say something about the evolution of key current account 
imbalances and real values of currencies.  In this regard our approach can answer two 
central questions. First, how “sustainable” is the U.S. current account deficit, in the sense 
that it has a persistent component. Second, in the adjustment of the current account to its 
long run value, how much must the dollar adjust.  
                                                 
2 Greenspan (2005) and Ferguson (2005) referred to simulations of this model in their 
assessment of the origins of the U.S. current account deficit. See Erceg et al. (2005a,b). 
For GEM, see Laxton et al. (2005). 
3 There are also a set of time series models invoking threshold effects; see Clarida et al. 
(2005).   - 3 -   
It is important to note that the results of our approach can be interpreted in a 
number of ways. Movements in the real exchange rate can be interpreted as consistent 
with the traditional view of currency values inducing expenditure switching. But, for 
those concerned with intellectual rigor, our approach is entirely consistent with the 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) approach, wherein exchange rate adjustment is jointly 
determined with tradable goods consumption reduction. Whereas they assume an 
exogenously imposed need for a reduction of the U.S. current account balance, we 
quantify how much of the U.S. imbalance will be eliminated, and simultaneously, how 
much the dollar will decline, given historically observed responses to shocks. Nor do we 
consider our approach as a substitute for the DSGE simulation or the event study 
approach. Rather, our study can be considered complementary to approaches that rely 
upon cross-country evidence, in contrast to our purely time series methodology.  
Without claiming full generality, this paper adopts a parsimonious method to 
decompose shocks in a manner relevant to the current debate. The role of the exchange 
rate being a point of contention, shocks are decomposed according to their long-run effect 
on the real exchange rate. In particular, Lee and Chinn (2002) found that the shocks with 
only temporary exchange rate effects brought about a negative correlation between the 
current account and the real exchange rate—current account improves as the exchange 
rate depreciates—while the shocks with permanent exchange rate effects did not 
necessarily bring about such a negative correlation. Then, to the extent that some of the 
current account deficit of the United States is driven by temporary shocks, its correction 
will be accompanied by a depreciation in the real exchange rate.    - 4 -   
Applying the framework to the current account imbalances of three largest 
economies—a deficit in the United States and surpluses in Japan and the Euro area— we 
find that a substantial part (nearly 2 percentage points of GDP) of the U.S. current 
account deficit in 2003 and 2004 is attributable to shocks that have only temporary 
effects on the real exchange rate. That is, the correction of that part of the U.S. current 
account deficit will go hand in hand with a depreciation of the U.S. real exchange rate. 
For Japan and the Euro area, a much smaller part of their current account surpluses in 
2004 are found to be driven by temporary shocks.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
conceptual framework of this note, and section III reports the estimation results. Section 
IV discusses the implication on the forthcoming adjustment on the basis of historical 
decomposition. Section V concludes.  
2. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK  
 
To explore the role of the exchange rate in the recent developments in the current 
account, we employ a statistical methodology to decompose the source of current account 
developments according to their long-term effect on the real exchange rate. 
Macroeconomic shocks that sway current account balances will also affect the real 
exchange rate. Some will have long-run effects while others have only temporary effects. 
As will be shown in this section, the shocks that have only temporary effects on the real 
exchange rate are exactly what motivate the widely held perception that exchange rate 
depreciates over the medium term when the current account deteriorates (a perception 
that is accurate).    - 5 -   
We decompose shocks into two types by adopting the econometric identification 
scheme of Blanchard and Quah (1989). One of the two fundamental shocks is postulated 
to have no long-term effect on the real exchange rate. The methodology can be 
summarized by the following bi-variate VAR, estimated for the current account ( t ca ) and 
the first-differenced real exchange rate ( t q ∆ ).  










⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
=+ =+ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ∆∆ ∆ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 ,        (1) 
where country-specific temporary shocks are denoted as 
T
t ε , and permanent shocks as 
P
t ε .  When   t ε  denotes the vector of temporary and permanent shocks, the following 
standard assumptions are made:  0 ) ( = t E ε ,   I E t t = ′) ( ε ε , and  0 ) ( = ′ s t E ε ε  when  s t ≠ .  
In a conventional VAR analysis, system (1) will be identified by assuming that 
(0) B is a lower triangular matrix. It amounts to assuming that the real exchange rate 
innovation has no contemporaneous effect on the current account, an assumption that is at 
odds with many theoretical models.  
In contrast, the Blanchard and Quah approach enables one to identify the system 
on the basis of a criterion that is consistent with a wide spectrum of intertemporal open 
macro models. It is assumed that temporary shocks have no long-run effect on the 
exchange rate, regardless of other characteristics of underlying shocks. Unlike the 
identification obtained by Choleski factorization that assumes a lower triangular  (0) B , 
the temporary and permanent shocks identified here should not necessarily be interpreted 
as shocks to the exchange rate and current account, respectively. Estimated innovations to   - 6 -   
the exchange rate and current account ( t η ) are both linear combinations of temporary and 
permanent shocks, because the off-diagonal elements of matrix  (0) B are non-zero.  
In an earlier paper examining the G7 countries, we found that the temporary and 
permanent shocks carry different relative importance for current account balances and 
exchange rates, and moreover that they induce different correlations between current 
account balances and exchange rates. In response to a temporary shock, the current 
account balance improves when the real exchange rate depreciates. In response to a 
permanent shock, however, the current account balance improves at the same time as the 
real exchange rate appreciates. This has clear implications for the current debate on the 
role of the exchange rate. To the extent that today’s current account imbalances are 
caused by temporary shocks, a real dollar depreciation is imminent. 
 
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
3.1 Data  
The current account and real exchange rate data are largely drawn from the 
International Financial Statistics database, at the quarterly frequency, except for the 
seasonally adjusted U.S. current account that was obtained from the BEA. For all three 
economies, the real effective exchange rates (based on CPI) are available since the first 
quarter of 1980. The current account data are available until 2004 for the United States 
and the Euro area and until 2003Q3 for Japan. The U.S. current account balances were 
adjusted for the Gulf War transfers of the early 1990s. In the econometric estimation, the 
current account balance is measured as the ratio of its dollar value to the dollar-  - 7 -   
denominated nominal GDP. The real exchange rate is the first-differenced log of the real 
effective exchange rate index based on the consumer price index.
4 
3.2 Estimating the VAR and Impulse Responses  
 
The VAR system was estimated with two lags for all three economies, based on 
standard criteria (Akaike information criterion and Schwartz criterion). However, a 
shorter sample ending in 2001Q4 was used for the United States, to avoid the post-2001 
period which suggests a substantial change in econometric relationship. Starting in 
2002Q1, the real effective exchange rate of the United States began to depreciate, while 
its current account deficit also kept on rising. The estimation over the full sample resulted 
in impulse response functions that were opposite to those obtained for the U.S. using any 
sample period that excludes 2004, and opposite to those obtained for other economies 
with any sample period (typical impulse responses are discussed in the next paragraph).
5 
Though not a rigorous test, we view this result as suggesting an anomaly in the external 
developments of the U.S. in recent years. Consequently, we used data preceding this 
period.  
Estimation results are reported in Table 1. In general they accord with one’s 
priors. It is more difficult to explain movements in real exchange rates than in current 
account balances. The 
2 R ’s for the exchange rate change equations range from 0.10 to 
0.13, while those for the current account balance take on values from 0.72 to 0.94. First 
                                                 
4 Greater detail is contained in the Data Appendix. 
5 While the econometric results are sensitive to the inclusion of the 2004 data for the 
U.S., the results for Japan and the Euro area are little affected as the end point of the 
sample is varied from 2002 to 2004.    - 8 -   
differences of the real exchange rate exhibit some serial correlation, with the coefficient 
on the lagged difference ranging from 0.22 to 0.31. In contrast, the current account 
balance exhibits substantial persistence, with the coefficient on the first lag taking on 
values as high as 0.87(for the United States).   
Applying structural decomposition to examine the effects of two different types of 
shocks, temporary versus permanent shocks are found to bring about opposite 
correlations between the real exchange rate and the current account. The impulse-
responses in Figures 1 to 3 show that for all three economies, a real depreciation 
accompanies an improvement in the current account under the temporary shocks. This 
corresponds to the oft-mentioned expenditure-switching effect on the current account of 
exchange rate changes. In contrast, for permanent shocks, a real appreciation goes hand 
in hand with an improvement in the current account, contradicting conventional wisdom 
regarding the current account balance - exchange rate relationship. It should emphasized 
that the identification criterion for temporary and permanent shocks impose no a priori 
restrictions on the signs of these correlations.  
The economic interpretation of the permanent and temporary shocks, discussed 
further in our previous paper (Lee and Chinn, 2002), can be summarized as follows. 
Temporary shocks find an easy candidate in monetary shocks. These are often viewed as 
having only a temporary effects on the real exchange rate, excepting long run net-wealth 
effects which are quantitatively tiny. Permanent shocks are more difficult to pin down. 
Typically, permanent shocks are associated with productivity innovations; however, this 
is often thought of as inducing a negative correlation between the current account and the 
exchange rate. We prefer the interpretation of the permanent shock as a preference shock   - 9 -   
in favor of home exports, which would have a long-run effect on the real exchange rate, 
while inducing a positive comovement between the current account and the real exchange 
rate.
6 It might be more useful to think of a negative value of this shock – a shock against 
home exports. One could interpret a “surprise” in government spending as a sort of 
negative preference shock, since government spending is likely to divert exportables back 
to home consumption. 
Regardless of their economic interpretation, what matters foremost for our current 
purpose is the existence of these two types of shocks and the different correlations 
between the current account and the exchange rate induced by these two shocks. It is the 
temporary shocks that induce the usual negative correlation between the current account 
and the real exchange rate.  
How do these estimated impulse response functions compare to our previous 
estimates? Since for the sample has changed somewhat – it is expanded by up to four 
years – one might expect some changes. For the U.S. and Japan, the changes are 
relatively minor. For the euro area that was not analyzed in our previous study, we 
compare it with the previous results for several member countries. We find the temporary 
component has an initial impact on the current account about three times as large as it did 
for Germany, but only about twice as large as for Italy. The impact of the permanent 
component is about the same as in Germany or France. 
                                                 
6 Abstracting away from temporary shocks, Blanchard et al. (2005) provides an analysis 
of preference shocks that have permanent effects on the real exchange rate. Consistent 
with our interpretation, a preference shock in favor of foreign exports generates a real 
depreciation and current account deficit along the adjustment path.   - 10 -   
 
4. HISTORY AND PROSPECTS  
 
Given the estimates of the structural matrix— (0) B  matrix in equation (1)—the 
estimated shocks to the current account and the real exchange rates can be decomposed 
into temporary and permanent shocks. By tracking their effects using the estimated 
coefficients, we can uncover the contribution of temporary and permanent shocks to the 
past movements in the current account and the real exchange rate. Subject to the initial 
conditions, which are the prevailing values of the current account and the real exchange 
rate at the beginning of the sample (in 1980), this historical decomposition brings to light 
how much of the current account imbalances are attributable to temporary and permanent 
shocks.  
One thing we know about the current account imbalance due to temporary shocks 
is that its adjustment (e.g. improvement in the case of the United States) will entail a 
movement in the real exchange rate in the opposite direction (thus a real U.S. dollar 
depreciation). The same temporary shocks will reverse its own effect on the exchange 
rate, for they have no permanent effects on the real exchange rate. That is, the portion of 
the current account due to temporary shocks is the amount of current account imbalance 
that will be corrected through a real exchange rate adjustment in the direction consistent 
with the conventional wisdom.  
Permanent shocks, on the other hand, do not lead to a usual comovement in the 
current account and the exchange rate. Given the stationary nature of the current account, 
the effect of permanent shocks to the current account will decay over time. But this   - 11 -   
process will not be accompanied by a movement in the exchange rate in any particular 
direction, because the permanent shocks will have a lasting effect on the exchange rate 
and no further adjustment in a particular direction is necessary.  
The historical decomposition of the U.S. current account and the real exchange 
rate is presented in Figure 4. The upper panel shows the current account in percent of 
GDP since 1983, the portion attributable to the initial values and deterministic factors 
(constant terms in the estimated VAR), and the portion attributable to these and 
permanent shocks (named “non-transitory component”). The lower panel shows the real 
exchange rate index and the portion attributable to comparable sources of shocks—
permanent shocks, deterministic factors, and initial values.   
The role of temporary shocks in the current account deficit and the exchange rate 
is strikingly large in the United States. Almost a half of the current account deficit since 
2000 is attributed to temporary shocks, suggesting that its correction will entail a 
depreciation in the real exchange rate. After the correction of the deficit due to temporary 
shocks, there still remains a small deficit due to permanent shocks. This deficit will also 
decline, to bring the current account close to the deterministic part, but without 
necessarily involving exchange rate adjustment.  
Turning to the exchange rate, a large gap opened between the actual exchange rate 
and its long-term component during the last several years. The gap had peaked in 2002 
and has since narrowed slightly. Nevertheless, in 2004, a gap of more than 10 percent 
exists between the actual real exchange rate and its long-term component driven by non-
transitory shocks. While the real depreciation of the past two years has brought the value   - 12 -   
of the U.S. dollar down close to its 1997-98 value -- when the actual rate matched the 
long-term component of the exchange rate -- the long-term component itself has declined 
further since then, so that the gap between the actual and long run equilibrium has 
remained largely unchanged.  
How do these results relate to the ongoing debate? First, the exchange rate result 
has something of the flavor of the Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate concept, in 
which the permanent component is extracted by virtue of a transitory-permanent 
decomposition; however, in this case, the decomposition is bivariate in nature.
7 Thus, in 
the sense of deviating from an “equilibrium value”, the dollar remains overvalued. 
The non-transitory component also seems quite large in absolute value, at -4.14 
percent of GDP compared to a recorded value for 2004 of -5.68 percent of GDP. What 
this indicates is that exchange rate depreciation associated with the conventional 
adjustment process will not return the current account deficit to something less than 4 
percent of GDP by itself. A further reduction of the current account deficit will follow as 
the effect of permanent shocks on the current account wanes. That part of adjustment, 
however, does not necessarily involve a further exchange rate realignment, according to 
the impulse-response analysis discussed earlier.  
The question of how far the current account deficit will decline can be answered 
by our estimate of the deterministic component of the current account – essentially that 
part of the historical decomposition arising from initial values and estimated constants in 
                                                 
7 A closely related approach is in MacDonald and Swagel (2000). See the discussion in 
Driver and Westaway (2004).   - 13 -   
the VARs. The estimate suggests that current account deficit will decline to about 3.0 
percent of GDP when various shocks work their ways out. This answer can also inform 
the debate regarding the “sustainable current account.” Here, we take the view that a 
current account deficit of about 3.0 percent is “sustainable” in the sense that – based upon 
historical correlations – the deficit will revert to this value.  
This conclusion may be surprising to those who believe that that a zero current 
account deficit must be achieved eventually. However, it is important to note that, with 
the economy growing over the long term, a negative current account balance and stable 
debt to GDP ratio are compatible. Furthermore, given the fact that the United States has 
earned more on its assets abroad than foreigners have earned on the assets they own in 
the U.S., there is extra “wiggle room” for running a deficit. Kouparitsas (2005) has 
calculated the sustainable net exports deficit at 1.4 percent of GDP. Different 
assumptions lead to slightly higher numbers (although none are near a current account 
deficit of 6 percent of GDP, which is predicted for 2005).
8  
For Japan and the Euro area, a large part of the short-run movement in the current 
account is attributed to temporary shocks while the big medium-term swings in the 
current account appear to be driven by permanent shocks. In both economies, temporary 
components account for a small part of current account surpluses in 2004. The correction 
of these temporary-shock-driven surpluses will entail some appreciation in their real 
exchange rates. Interestingly, however, the magnitude of the implied appreciations is 
quite small.  
                                                 
8 IMF (2005) forecasts 6.1%, while the Economist (October 1-7, 2005) survey of 
economists indicates 6.3%.   - 14 -   
This reading is confirmed by the lower-panel figures of the exchange rate. While 
the bulk of the exchange rate movement in both Japan and the Euro area is attributed to 
permanent shocks, temporary shocks are found to have played a bigger role in the 
movement of Japan’s real exchange rate over the past two years. Without the contribution 
of temporary shocks, the real value of the yen would have been higher than its observed 
value.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Speculation abounds on the likely path of the U.S. exchange rate, given the 
unprecedented magnitude of the current account deficit. In the discussion of “global 
rebalancing”, the potential counterparts in the adjustment of the U.S. current account 
deficit, the surpluses of two largest economies (Japan and the Euro area) have also 
attracted much attention. In this paper, we have attempted to impose some structure upon 
the discussion of what is a normal current account and exchange rate level, for the three 
key economies.  
By applying a simple identification criterion that decomposes the shocks to those 
that do not have a long-run effect on the real exchange rate (termed temporary shocks) 
and those that do (termed permanent shocks), the portion of the current account that will 
adjust via the conventional real exchange rate channel was estimated. The U.S. current 
account imbalances recorded for 2004 predict a further dollar decline of nearly 20 
percent, conditional upon the shocks already observed. Hence, despite the dollar’s decline 
since 2002, the U.S. currency appears destined for a further real depreciation, although   - 15 -   
interestingly, the total decline is less than estimates obtained in other studies (e.g., 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). In a striking contrast, an appreciation of a much smaller 
magnitude is anticipated for Japan and the Euro area. This might reflect the fact that a 
large part of the U.S. current account deficit is incurred vis-à-vis the other countries not 
included in our analysis.  
Obviously, what we have recounted above should not be construed as forecasts of 
the current account or the exchange rate of these three economies. This is because the 
projections into the future are conditional upon the shocks already observed (and recall, 
by definition the shocks are unpredictable).  In addition, it is important to recall that our 
estimates of the non-transitory components of the current account and the exchange rate 
are merely estimates–and that considerable uncertainty circumscribes each of these 
estimates. 
Interestingly, those who argue that the past three years of U.S. economic behavior 
has been aberrant would find confirmation in our results, as we were unable to model the 
2002-04 period in a satisfactory manner. We are agnostic on whether this has been 
caused by a “global savings glut”. However, to the extent that we are able to model the 
U.S. current account balance and dollar behavior over the period up to end-2001, we do 
not view this phenomenon as one that has explained the current account deficit over the 
entire post-East Asian crisis period. Rather it appears to be of fairly recent origin, and 
hence may prove less durable than some commentators have conjectured. 
Finally, we note two limitations of the analysis we have undertaken. The first 
limitation is that we do not allow for interactions between the economies, at least directly.   - 16 -   
The statistical analysis of the U.S. economy was conducted implicitly viewing the world 
through a two-country model; then the process was repeated for Japan and the Euro area.  
A second, and more important, limitation is that the analysis is predicated upon 
the future looking like the past. Yet, by virtue of the sheer absolute magnitude of present-
day imbalances, we are in uncharted territory. Of course, that is a limitation shared by all 
the modes of analysis currently being used. 
    - 17 -   
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Real Exchange Rates: CPI deflated trade weighed indices (series rec), drawn from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. See Bayoumi, Lee and Jayanthi (2005) for description 
of index characteristics. 
 
Current account balances: Dollar amounts, drawn from IMF, International Financial 
Statistics, for U.S and Japan. The U.S. current account balance is obtained from the BEA 
and adjusted to omit the effect of Gulf War transfers, using figures reported in various 
issues of Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Survey of Current Business. The euro area 
current account balance in euro is drawn from the Area Wide Model (AWM) database 
described in Fagan et al. (2001), located on the Euro Area Business Cycle Network 
website (http://www.eabcn.org/data/awm/index.htm). In all cases, current account 










CAY DRE CAY DRE CAY DRE
CAY(-1) 0.97 0.41 0.53 1.33 0.66 0.05
(0.11) (1.01) (0.09) (0.78) (0.10) (0.15)
[ 9.19] [0.39] [ 5.62] [ 1.71] [ 6.57] [ 0.31]
CAY(-2) -0.01 0.07 0.28 -0.51 0.18 -0.01
(0.11) (1.07) (0.09) (0.73) (0.09) (0.15)
[ -0.07] [ 0.07]    [3.21] [ -0.70] [ 1.86] [ -0.04]
DRE(-1) -0.01 0.22 -0.01 2.28 -0.13 0.30
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11)
[-0.61] [ 2.02] [-0.60] [ 2.67] [-1.76] [ 2.81]
DRE(-2) -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.16 0.17 0.06
(0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
[-0.85] [-0.26]    [3.67] [ -1.61] [ 2.35] [ 0.52]
C -0.001 0.01 0.005 -0.017 0.001 0.0002
(0.001) (0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002) (0.003)
[-1.86] [ 1.98] [ 3.56] [-1.50] [ 0.41] [0.05]
 R-squared 0.94 0.10 0.75 0.13 0.70 0.11
 Log likelihood
 Akaike info criterion
 Schwarz criterion
 Sample
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
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